Monarch Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam International, Ltd. 1992 WL 150641 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1992) by Madigan, Melissa
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology 
& Intellectual Property Law 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Spring 1993 Article 9 
Monarch Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam International, Ltd. 1992 WL 
150641 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1992) 
Melissa Madigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip 
Recommended Citation 
Melissa Madigan, Monarch Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam International, Ltd. 1992 WL 150641 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 
1992), 3 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 83 (1993) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol3/iss2/9 
This Case Summaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized 
editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
tual compilations. However, the court continued its
analysis because the Copyright Act categorizes maps
not as factual compilations but as "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works" and the Fifth Circuit agreed that
maps do, in fact, have an inherent pictorial or photo-
graphic nature. Again, only minimal creativity was
required to achieve protection.' The court ruled
Mason's pictorial portrayals of the area were products
of his own skill and judgement and were entitled to
copyright protection as pictorial works as well. 9
The final issue for the court was whether Mason
could receive statutory damages for acts of infringe-
ment of the same work committed after copyright reg-
istration but which were part of a series of infringe-
ments that commenced prior to registration.
According to section 412 of the Copyright Act, statuto-
ry damages cannot be awarded for any infringement
which begins after the first publication but before the
copyright is registered.,' However, the court found
section 412 unclear as it applied to a series of
infringements against the same work; either each act
of infringement was to be treated separately or the
series was to be treated as a single infringing act3 1
The District Court chose the latter interpretation and
denied statutory damages for all infringements of a
work if one of those infringements commenced prior
to registration.' The Fifth Circuit agreed, citing the
legislative history2 and the purpose2 of section 412 as
support.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court also
looked to section 50425 which provides for statutory
damages as a form of relief. According to the court,
under section 504(c)(1) the number of "awards" of
statutory damages a plaintiff can recover depends on
the number of works infringed and the number of
infringers, not on the number of infringements of
those works."5 Thus, when the same defendant
infringes the same work many times the series is
treated as a whole. Mason registered one map in 1968
and the other 232 maps in 1987. Since, the defen-
dant's alleged acts of infringement began before 1987,
the court ruled Mason could recover statutory dam-
ages only for infringements of the original map he
registered in 1968.27
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit makes
clear that the Copyright Act protects a map as an orig-
inal work when preparation involves a certain
amount of discretion and judgement. Thus, a suffi-
ciently original map is protectable either as a factual
compilation or as a "pictorial work." However, the
court emphasized that registration of a copyright is
essential, as it preserves the copyright owner's rights
to seek statutory damages for infringement.
Ann E. Dustman
1. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West Supp. 1992).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 504-505 (1988).
3. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 136 (5th
Cir. 1992).
4. See Id. at 143.
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
6. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc,. 967 F.2d at 138
(emphasis in original).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 138-39.
9. Id. at 138 (citing Toro Co. v. R. & R. Products Co., 787
F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986)).
10. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d at 138.
11. Id.
12. Id.; See also Id. at 140 n.7 (noting that implicit in this
determination is a consideration of originality of the expression
because, if "original", then it is clear the idea can, in fact, be
expressed in a variety of ways).
13. Id. at 140.
14. Id. at 141 (citing Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991)).
15. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1976)).
16. Id. at 142 (citing Feist Publications Inc., v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co.,, 111 S. Ct. at 1287).
17. Id. at 141; See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining
"compilation").
18. Id. at 142.
19. Id.
20. 17 U.S.C. 5 412 (1988).
21. See Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d at 143.
22. Id. at 143.
23. The House Report explained that section 412 of the
Copyright Act denies statutory damages where infringement takes
place before registration, indicating the series should be treated as
a whole. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d at 143 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 1476 at 158 (emphasis added)).
24. Section 412 of the Copyright Act was intended to
encourage copyright registration since this was the way an author
could preserve his right to recover statutory damages. Mason v.
Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d at 143.
25. Section 504 of the Copyright Act provides in pertinent
part: "The copyright owner may elect... to recover an award of
statutory damages for all infringements involved in the action with
respect to any one work, for which any one infringer is liable indi-
vidually." 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1988).
26. Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d at 143.
27. Id. at 144.
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INTRODUCTION
The plaintiff, Monarch Licensing Ltd. ("Monarch"),
sought a preliminary injunction against its former
licensee, Ritam International Ltd. ("Ritam"), in connec-
tion with a toy, to which Monarch had been granted
exclusive rights by its French inventor. The action
was brought under, inter alia, Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act for false designation of origin, under the
New York common law of trademark infringement
and unfair competition, and breach of contract'. The
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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied Monarch's motion, stating that Monarch
failed to show likelihood of success on the merits.
FACTS
Monarch is a New York corporation in the busi-
ness of licensing toys. Ritam is an Iowa corporation
which develops and markets toys. Monarch had been
granted exclusive rights to license a new toy com-
pound by its French inventor. The compound was a
soft, stretchable, shapable, putty-like substance which
could be rolled into a ball and bounced. In February
1991, Ritam entered into an exclusive licensing agree-
ment with Monarch to market the compound, known
as "Ooz Ball". The agreement provided that copyright
and/or trademark rights in the name "Ooz Ball" may
be either owned or controlled by the licensor,
Monarch; that the licensee, Ritam, owned the copy-
right and/or trademark rights in the name "Ooz Ball"
during the term of the agreement; and that Ritam
would assign these rights to Monarch upon termina-
tion of the license. Additionally, all copyrights in the
Ooz Ball, its packaging and advertising were to
belong to Ritam and upon termination of the license,
all rights, title and interest were to be assigned to
Monarch.
In February 1991, Ritam introduced the Ooz Ball
to the U.S. toy market. The name "Ooz Ball" was con-
spicuously displayed at the top of the blister card.
The slogan "The Pod of Intergalactic Ooze", along
with the tag lines "String It", "Stretch It", "Web It", and
"Bounce It" also appeared on the packaging. A copy-
right notice in Ritam's name and the statement "Ooz
TM Ball and The Pod of Intergalactic Ooze TM are
trademarks of Ritam International, Ltd.," were located
on the bottom of the blister card.
Monarch terminated its agreement with Ritam on
December 6, 1991 asserting that Ritam failed to
account for royalties to Monarch. After the termina-
tion, Ritam did not assign the trademarks and copy-
rights back to Monarch as called for in the agreement.
Ritam contends that Monarch breached the exclu-
sivity provision of their agreement by authorizing a
competitor to market the compound under another
name. Additionally, Ritam states that much of the
compound shipped to it by Monarch's manufacturer
was defective, thus pursuant to Paragraph 19(e)2 of
the agreement, Ritam sought and contracted with
another manufacturer to provide it with an ooze-type
compound, which Ritam subsequently in 1992 mar-
keted under the name "Ooze". For these reasons
Ritam took the position that it was not obliged to
assign the trademarks and copyrights back to
Monarch because the termination of the agreement
was not a "normal termination". In marketing its
"Ooze" product, Ritam utilized the same tag lines
which had appeared on the "Ooz Ball" blister card.
Monarch sought a preliminary injunction for false
designation of origin under the Lanham Act, New
York common law for trademark infringement and
unfair competition, and for breach of contract.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
First, Monarch contended that it, and not Ritam,
was the owner of the copyrights and trademarks asso-
ciated with the Ooz Ball. Second, Monarch asserted
that trademark rights attach to the mark "Ooz Ball",
and thus, Ritam infringed those rights with its new
mark "Ooze". Third, Monarch claimed infringement as
to trade dress asserting that Ritam's use of the same
tag lines on its "Ooze" product packaging as were
found on the Ooz Ball packaging constituted infringe-
ment. Because Monarch sought an injunction, the
court analyzed the merits of the caseA
In its analysis of Monarch's likelihood of success
on the merits, the court first addressed the issue of
ownership of the trade name "Ooz Ball". Ownership
of the name in this case stemmed from the contractu-
al agreement between Monarch and Ritam. Since
Ritam had not assigned the name "Ooz Ball" back to
Monarch as called for in the contract, the court decid-
ed that Ritam was still the legal owner of the name. It
did not, however, use Ritam's refusal to assign the
mark to Monarch to deny the preliminary injunction,
thus it did not place form over substance. The court
simply found it unnecessary to resolve the ownership
issue since Monarch's position contained so many
other defects.
Next, the court addressed the strength of "Ooz
Ball" as a trademark. In its analysis, it looked first at
the mark's protectibility. Distinctiveness is ordinarily
required to establish protectible trademark rights.' A
generic mark is not protected under such rights while
a descriptive mark, as opposed to a distinctive mark,
is only protectible if a secondary meaning is shown.'
The court found that a strong argument could be
made that the "Ooz Ball" mark, when used in connec-
tion with the compound was generic and therefore,
unprotectible. The "Ooz Ball" mark was used to des-
ignate a product which was described by those
words. The product was shaped like a ball and was
meant to be used as a ball. The material from which it
was made was ooze, "a thick viscous liquid which
flows slowly".6 The package described the product as
a pod of "Intergalactic Ooze". The instruction
described how to restore the toy's "ooz-ability" in
case it dried up. Additionally, other manufacturers of
similar toys used the word "ooze" as part of the mark
of their products. The court found that, at best, the
trademark sat "at the low end of the descriptive cate-
"1 7gory".
A weak descriptive mark will be given less pro-
tection against use of similar marks by others in the
same areas of trade." Where the similarity lies in the
use of a descriptive term and is only part of the mark,
there may be no infringement.9 The less distinctive
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and more descriptive a mark, the less likely it is that
consumer confusion will result from the use of a
mark that is similar with small differences."0 The court
explained that the only similarity between Monarch's
"Ooz Ball" and Ritam's "Ooze" occurs as to the word
which describes the product. The similarity was not
enough to be considered infringement upon "Ooz
Ball" because it was such a weak descriptive mark
and consumer confusion was unlikely to result.
Weak descriptive marks are often given a narrow
scope of trademark protection for reasons of public
policy. "The trademark law accords monopoly rights
in distinctive designations to permit traders in com-
merce to establish valuable reputations (goodwill) for
their products or services through reliable perfor-
mance, and to permit the public to rely on past expe-
rience with satisfactory and unsatisfactory marks to
guide their future custom."" It is difficult to justify the
granting of monopoly rights to descriptive marks, and
thus exclude others from access to those descriptive
marks, especially when there is an unlimited number
of distinctive marks available for a commercial entity
to use to identify itself.'2 The court next addressed
Monarch's claim of trade dress infringement. Accord-
ing to the recent Second Circuit decision in
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., to justify enforce-
ment of trademark rights in trade dress under the
Lanham Act, a secondary meaning must be shown in
trade dress.'0 Trade dress obtains secondary meaning
"when the purchasing public associates its design
with a single producer rather than simply with the
product"." The acquisition of a secondary meaning
can be determined by looking to such factors as
length and exclusivity of trade dress, advertising
expenditures, sales success, studies establishing con-
sumer recognition, and unsolicited media coverage."
On this issue, the court stated only that Monarch had
made no showing of secondary meaning in its trade
dress.
Secondary meaning can also be inferred from the
fact of copying. 6 When copying a trade dress, it is
inferred that the second user perceives a commercial
value in doing so.' 7 This perceived advantage flows
from consumer recognition.'8 On this issue, the court
pointed out that there was no copying on the part of
Ritam, because Ritam simply continued to use certain
aspects of trade dress that it had previously used
when it had been marketing the "Ooz Ball".
Accordingly, without secondary meaning, Monarch
could not prevail on its claim of trade dress infringe-
ment.
Even if secondary meaning had been shown, the
court questioned the protectibility of the trade dress:
the use of descriptive tag lines placed on the packag-
ing which describes the features of the product. It
questioned whether tag lines which were descriptive
of the product were protectible, since ordinarily, trade
dress can be protectible only if it is distinctive.' 9
Further, under the Lanham Act, descriptive tag lines
used adjectivally and not used as a trademark, most
likely fall within the category of "fair use".- The tag
lines "String It", "Stretch It", "Web It", and "Bounce It"
described the features of the product, lacked distinc-
tiveness, and likely would be considered "fair use"
under the Lanham Act, thus, the court found they
were not protectible and could not be infringed.
Additionally, the court questioned Monarch's
claim of ownership rights in the trade dress. The
agreement between Monarch and Ritam asserted no
claim by Monarch in any trade dress which might be
developed by Ritam. Neither did it oblige Ritam to
assign trade dress to Monarch upon termination of the
agreement.
CONCLUSION
In denying Monarch's motion for a preliminary
injunction, the court suggested that not only had
Monarch failed to show likelihood of success on the
merits, but that Monarch's position was so substan-
tively weak, that it was unlikely to succeed on the
merits.
Melissa Madigan
1. Monarch also brought the action under New York
General Business Law sections 349 and 350 for deceptive acts and
practices and false advertising; and for wrongful disclosure and use
of confidential information. Ritam counterclaimed for breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, common
law unfair competition, and unjust enrichment. In its disposition of
the case, the court did not address any of these issues. Monarch
Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam International Ltd., Inc., et. al., 1992 WL
150641, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1992).
2. Paragraph 19(c) states that "if Licensor is for any reason
unable to make available to Licensee such supplies of the licensed
Property as may be ordered by Licensee from time to time, the
Licensor shall permit Licensee to enter into such arrangements as
Licensee shall think fit for Licensees own direct manufacture of the
Licensed Property accordingly." Id. at "9.
3. In the Second Circuit, a party seeking a preliminary
injunction must show "irreparable harm, and either 1) a likelihood
of success on the merits, or 2) sufficiently serious questions going
to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a bal-
ance of hardships tipping decidedly in the moving party's favor. Id.
at "3. The court found that, even assuming irreparable harm,
Monarch was not entitled to a preliminary injunction because 1)
Monarch failed to show likelihood of success on the merits, 2) it
found Monarch's showing of questions going to the merits not suf-
ficiently serious to make them fair ground for litigation, and 3)
Monarch failed to show that the balance of hardships tipped in its
favor, Id. at *8-9.
4. Id. at *5.
5. Id.
6. Although Monarch dropped the silent "e" from ooze,
such a spelling change which does not affect pronunciation will
not normally save a generic mark. Id.
7. Id.
8. id. at *6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at "7.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *7 (citing Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., Nos.
91-7869, -7917, (2d Cir. May 15, 1992)). However, the Supreme
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